Unlike Bachelet with Villalobos, Sebastián Piñera will have no doubts about whether to decide to remove Hermes Soto. The president knows that the order they have made with Carabineros since November 14 is a vital line to keep up one of their campaigns that the region is creating more than expected expectations – 62% – and the country: ending violence in La Araucania. And, of course, the weak result of the 37% approval in the QES studies and the criteria known last Friday are an incentive to take measures that help improve public perceptions, even though one general must reject it, a few months
November 14 will be like those days in which there is a turning point in which history makes a turn, a moment, a part of the time that slips into reality that reveals the weaknesses, inconsistencies and mistakes, otherwise they could not come out. The shots carried out by Sergeant Carlos Alarcon not only downplayed the Impulso Araquina plan two months after the premiere but also revealed the depth of the Caribeñeros crisis. Peacekeeping fraud, called "Pacogate" and Operation "Hurray", are the heads that preceded this kind of tragedy for Carabineros. Your 14N.
The truth is that the story, which began with – at this time – suspicious vehicle theft at a school located in the center of the conflict zone had a turn that could still bring bigger surprises. Just remember that the Director-General moved to the region two days later and at the time said he was doing so to support the jungle command staff. In addition to the confusing nature of the statement – Communero was killed by his subordinates – Hermes Soto forgot to point out the most important thing: Minister Chadwick had made him go on stage. The chain of mistakes, untrustworthy information, changes in testimonies, and senior officials' participation in the episode surpasses the imagination of Netflix's most creative team.
But the most serious thing is that obviously there was a direct, planned and conscious intervention by lawyers, colonels and generals to "instruct" participating sergeants to deliver a version that would reduce the severity of events and affect it without the damaged image and the reputation of Carabineros. How is it possible for the former Chief Inspector for Security and Intelligence, the second person on board the institution to arrive at the dawn of the place where the accused has given his statements and to meet them between interrogation and interrogation? Does the message delivered to former Sergeant Alarcon's video in which he said he was "forced to lie" is a way to defend and warn the high command that he can give details of his statement to the prosecutor?
In this chain of intrigues, General Hermes Soto is targeted and seriously damaging his image. The senior official was confused, reactive, and tangled with the government. After the words "They lied to us," which he spoke with Minister Chadwick and who was understood as an unreserved endorsement of his mandate, La Modeda distanced himself and treated Soto as a student who must take exams every day. give instructions that you should follow without questioning.
Of course, suspicions about how much the general knew the details caused mistrust, which seemed to grow, as details were known. Could it be that former General Franzoni did not call Hermes Soto to tell him about his interview with the people involved and the responsible officers in La Araucania? Do Karabineros' lawyers, in such a delicate case, do not inform the senior official about their defense strategy? Curious.
The treatment received by the Caribbean Executive, especially during the last week, should cause a lot of concern among employees. The evil, so bad that the right-wing government is what offers profound restructuring, questioning and decision-making for them, surely awakened a nostalgic feeling for left-wing governments. Bachelet supported Vilalobos until the last moment, despite the two scandals that the institution lived on.
Last Saturday, President Sebastian Pinera announced the withdrawal of Gope from La Araucania. Despite the transcendental decision, this time he is not accompanied by the Director-General. On the contrary, he was accompanied by his entire political team. The alert was clear that the president wants to give political leadership to a crisis that needs a turn, a change of direction urgently before the end of this month, otherwise the Araucania plan "will go to March" and his chances to end natural death they are high.
But in addition to the end of the famous jungle command, the authorities said the police should be trained in multicultural issues, human rights, and that it would present a plan for restructuring Carabineros, a process that would be controlled by the deputy minister of interior. In other words, the police institution was involved by La Moneda. The political control, direction and changes that will come will be decided by the President and the Minister of the Interior and will be followed by the police. Then the Director-General is in a very embarrassing position from now on. The question is whether this change process should be with or without the one that is still part of the problem, not the solution. And, of course, it remains to be seen whether the general "lied" anyone, ie. his subordinate from the highest hierarchical level of the sergeant who murdered Katarlanka, or realized he had interfered somewhere in the chain.
Well, and unlike Bachelet with Villalobos, Sebastián Piñera will have no doubt whether to make the decision to remove Hermes Soto. The president knows that the order they have made with Carabineros since November 14 is a vital line to keep up one of their campaigns that the region is creating more than expected expectations – 62% – and the country: ending violence in La Araucania. And, of course, the weak result of the 37% approval in the QES studies and the criteria known last Friday are an incentive to take measures that help improve public perceptions, even though one general must reject it, a few months